Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Introduction
In the past few decades, considerable research effects have been made on the control issues of the NCSs where physical process, sensors and actuators are linked together through communication network [1] . Modeling, analysis and synthesis for the NCSs have been received great attention with its extensively 5 applied in many potential areas such as internet of things (IoT), smart grids and unmanned aerial vehicles [2, 3] .
Because of the deep integration of physical systems and networks, communication resources, as the medium of signal transmission, become more and more important for control implementations and many works devote themselves to 10 save network bandwidth and reduce communication load [4, 5] . With the development of digital circuits and networked control technologies, the event-based control scheme has been paid more and more attentions from the control engineering community [6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ]. This event-based strategy implement their control actions as they need which lead to a less communication consumption.
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Recent years has witnessed significant advances on the event-triggered control scheme and many results are discussed such as [11, 12, 13] and there references in.
Obviously, these event-triggered control strategies are sensitive to sampled-data while reducing the quantities of communication. These exchanged event-based 20 data in the NCSs without security protection is easy attacked by malicious adversaries [14, 15, 16] and this lead to time delay, packet dropouts and disorder problems. Although such problems have been studied from different perspectives for the traditional NCSs, they may be not suitable for safety constraint scenarios. Hence,the NCSs are more and more vulnerable to various malicious 25 attacks due to the ever-increasing openness of communication networks [17] .
Recently, there are some works have been drawn attention to this raw field such as [18, 19, 20, 21] and there references in and the most studies focus on two common attack types, namely, DoS attacks [22, 23, 24, 25, 26 ] to communication networks and physical attacks [27, 28, 29, 30 ] to industrial process. 30 In this paper, we will discuss the DoS attacks for the NCSs. As well known, time delays would be caused by DoS attacks. Although periodic attacks [23] , Bernoulli process [31, 24, 26] , (hiden) Markov process [32, 33] , zero-sum stochastic game [34] , time delay approach [35, 36] , switched system model [24] are often used to modeling the effects of DoS attacks in the NCSs, the time delay caused 35 by DoS attacks is different from traditional ones caused by network uncertain-
ties. An DoS attacker may not follow any deterministic manners or specific rules such as periodic behavior or probability distribution. Based on this view point, the time delay approach is more suitable for describing the DoS attack behaviors. By considering the energy-constraint of DoS attacks, the less con-
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servative for the time delay, the longer DoS duration can be tolerated for the system. Therefore, it is necessary to design a security controller to tolerant a more larger time delay or packet dropouts. For triggered-packet dropouts, Sun et. al [37] investigate the stability of event-triggered control system subject to one-step packet dropout with the concept of average dwell time in switched 45 systems. Dimarogonas et. al [38] proposed a non-monotonic approach to cope with the triggered-packet dropouts case. Perisis et. al [25] characterize the relationship between frequency and duration of DoS attacks while preserving ISS stability by estimating the system evolution with/without DoS attacks. Peng et. al [36] proposed a co-design method for a resilient event-triggering strategy 50 to tolerant a degree of packet dropouts by adjusting the triggering parameter.
Girard [39] proposed dynamic triggering mechanism for event-triggered control when the event-triggered condition is violated. When a larger time delay caused by DoS attacks, on the one hand, it is very conservative for solving LMIs and hard to design a larger time delay tolerable controller, on the other hand, it is 55 also not applicable for changing controller when the system is running although such a larger time delay tolerable controller can be designed.
In fact, there always exist such a time delay caused by DoS attacks that the system can not be tolerated for a given controller. Then the system have to degrade running under this circumstance. By considering that the DoS attacks 60 will lead to lost of security performance through altering the previous triggering condition, the main contributions of this technical note can be summarized as
• According to the alteration of triggering condition due to DoS attacks, a novel security-performance-based resilient triggering strategy is proposed under the DoS attack scenario.
65
• The corresponding security performance analysis and event-triggered controller design under the proposed resilient triggering strategy are discussed in order to guarantee the NCSs security performance.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries of event-triggered control framework as well as the proposed resilient The NCS framework is shown as in Fig. 1 where the control implementation are relay on a shared communication network. Owing to the opening of network, there are also some malicious attacks will imposed on the NCSs. It easy Suppose that the sensor is time triggered with sampling period h and its sampling sequence is described by the set S 1 = {0, h, 2h, · · · kh}, k ∈ N. By collecting these sampling data, the event trigger will transmit such sample data x(kh)
if the pre-designed triggering condition is violated. We denote these triggered sampling sequence as the set S 2 = {0,
Then the actuators will implement their control actions with these successfully transmitted sampled data, namely,
However, the transmission failure will occur for these triggered packets when they are suffering from DoS attacks. So, the control action will hold until the DoS ceased and this leads to unexpected control performance. 
Security-oriented Resilient Triggering Strategy
In engineering practice, DoS attacks are hard to defense because it is often posterior or unpredictable. Therefore, it is impracticable to change controller or sampling frequency temporarily to tolerate such a attack. On the one hand, the DoS attacks will caused bad control performance, but on the other hand, 85 not all DoS attacks will lead to the system crash. That is, the NCSs may run in degrade model with a certain security performance when DoS attacks happened.
That is, the actual error between the value of the last successful transmitted state and the value of the current state is beyond the expected range due to DoS attacks. So, we will focus on the excessive error which caused the alteration 90 of the triggering condition. As shown in Fig. 2 , there are three work models
Figure 2 Diagram of the NCSs under DoS attacks according to the event-based triggering conditions
• Safety region. In this region, there are no DoS attacks and every triggered packets can be transmitted successfully.
• Resilient region. In this region, there are DoS attacks and an extra trig-95 gered error is generated. However, this error can be tolerable for the NCSs.
• Un-safety region. In this region, there are DoS attacks and an intolerable error for the NCSs is generated.
In order to describe the performance lost caused by DoS attacks in more detail, it is necessary to illustrate the proposed resilient triggering strategy based on the security-based performance. For clear exposition, we first denote the last successful control update time instant as t k h and the future transmitted sampling instant according to the security event-triggered condition (no extra triggered error) as t k+1 h. However, t k+1 h may be prolong to t In general, one can launch their DoS attacks at any time but limit duration. Therefore, we can described the limited energy of DoS attacks by
and
where ∆ dos represents the maximum duration of DoS attacks.
Let
where e(i k h) represent the error between the value of process state x(t k h) at the last successful control update and the value of process state x(i k h) at the current time.
In order to record the pre-designed triggered instant t k+1 h and x(t k+1 ), an buffer is needed for the event-trigger. Then, the extra error due to DoS attacks can be calculated by
where e dos (i k h) represent the error between the value of process state x(t k+1 h) according to previous triggering condition and the value of process state x(i k h)
at the current time. Obviously, the introduction of error e dos (i k h) will lead to a bad control performance, even security problem. Based on the above analysis, we will illustrate our proposed security-orient resilient triggering strategy as
where Υ(∆ dos t k+1 h ) represent the variation of triggering condition with Υ(∆
According to (5) , one can obtain that the uncertain of triggering condition should be constrained by limited energy of DoS attacks, namely,
In addition, we can divide the holding interval of the t ∈ I into subsets I =
) with I = ∪I according to [40] , and the delay version of system can be constructed for every two successfully transmitted instants by defining η(t) t − i k h. Then, the controller can be transformed into
and the actual control action with sample-error-dependent model is given as
Remark 1: We refer to an effective DoS attack as the fact that may prevent 100 control update from being executed at desired time. In fact, the control performance lost is caused by this triggering variation (9) due to DoS attacks. In order to indicate the maximum allowable performance lost for control system, the triggering variation Υ(∆ dos t k+1 h ) should be limited by (9) for the control system. Noticed that if ξ(i k h) = 1 for t ∈ (t k h, t k+1 h), the DoS attacks will not make under the above resilient triggering strategy (8) while ensuring a certain security 115 performance. In detail, the following two states are shown to reflect our control goals 1. When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotically stable with H ∞ performance.
2. When there are DoS attacks, the security performance with uniformly 120 ultimately bounded is achieved, i.e. the performance lost ||L(x(t))|| ≤ B.
Here, ||L(x(t))|| is the performance lost due to DoS attacks with its upper bound B.
security-orient analysis under DoS attacks
In this section, the security performance analysis are given by some math- Proof: Let ζ
However, recalling the prescribed resilient event-triggering condition in (8), the following inequality
will make a contradiction with (12) . Therefore, we can easily obtained that
h. Subsequently, we will carry out the robust H ∞ and security performance analysis for the NCSs subjected to DoS attacks and the result is shown by the following Theorem 1. and S of appropriate dimensions such that 
where
Then, under the resilient triggering strategy (8), the system (11) is with the following property
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• When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotic stable with H ∞ performance.
• When there are DoS attacks, the security performance with uniformly ultimately bounded ||x(t)|| ≤
is achieved with perfor-
where ρ is related to Ξ and λ(P ) is the minimum eigenvalue of P .
Proof: Firstly, we consider the following candidate Lyapunov-Krasovskii function V x (t; x(t)) such that
Then, taking the time derivative along the trajectory of system (11) yieldṡ
By using Jessen inequality, the following relationship hold
for the augmented dynamical system given by (11) . Thus, substituting (16)- (19) into (15), taking (20) and (21) into account, we can find that
In what follows, we consider the robust H ∞ performance for the studied system with external disturbance. Recalling the fact that ||z(t)|| ≤ γ||w(t)||, it is easily
where Γ 2 = [C, 0, DK, 0, −DK, 0, 0] and
It is clear that
and this means that there is a positive scalar ε such that
−ε||x(t)||. Therefore, one can conclude that the system (11) is asymptotically stable and H ∞ performance of the studied system.
At last, considering the resilient triggering condition in (8), it is clear that
thus, we obtain that
where Ξ is defined in (14) .
Because of Ξ < 0, there must be a appropriate positive ρ such that χ
Multiply e ρt and integral on both sides of (28), then
where λ(P ) is the minimum eigenvalue of P .
Obviously, the performance lost is only related to the last term of (30) and it satisfy that
with B =
Remark 2: Theorem 1 shows that the security of network would affect the control performance of the NCSs. In fact, we can see that the control performance is DoS-depended from (32). The bigger Υ(∆ dos t k+1 h ), the more performance lost.
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In addition, the performance is also related to parameter ρ. The bigger ρ, the less performance lost. As well known, ρ is regard to the converge rate of the system. Intuitively, a fast converge rate will be more robust to DoS attack.
Security Controller Design under the Resilient Triggering Strategy
In this section, the event-based controller under the proposed resilient trig-160 gering is discussed. Based on Theorem. 1, we found that only the term Ξ is related to controller K. So, the following Theorem 2 is used to controller design in order to achieve the above two goals.
Theorem 2. For some given positive constants
then, the controlled system (11) can be secured by K = Y X −1 under the resilient triggering strategy (8), namely,
• When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotically stable
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with H ∞ performance.
and the performance lost
} is achieved.
Proof: Based on the above the designed controller, we will describe the system workflow as the following Fig.3 . In fact, the controller K, δ and Φ can be designed 190 according to [40] . Once there parameters are given, the system will be run in an excepted performance.
But the error e(i k h) will keep increasing regardless the e performance lost will be caused and this may be lead to the system crash.
Illustrative example
In this section, a simulation example is used to illustrate the security control method under the resilient triggering strategy.
Let us consider the pendulum example borrowed from [40] with its plant dynamics given bẏ
where M = 10 is the cart mass, m = 1 is the mass of the pendulum bob, l = 3 is the length of the pendulum arm and g = 10 is the gravitational acceleration. 
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The statistics shows that 145 packets are transmitted and the average period presented by comparing Fig.7 and Fig.9 which implies that one should trade-off between control performance and network security. 
Conclusions
As so far, we have investigated the resilient triggering strategy for the event-
based NCSs under DoS attacks. For the NCSs, the following three facts are: the DoS attacks is unpredictable, 2) it is impractical to change a controller when system is running, and 3) the network security will propagate to the physical 235 system which will lead to the lost of control performance. Based on the above facts, the NCSs must be capable to tolerate a certain degree of DoS attacks. In this paper, a novel resilient triggering strategy caused by DoS attacks is proposed and the control performance lost is well confined according to the designed event-based controller. It is worthy noting that the proposed resilient triggering 240 strategy takes the relationship between the uncertain of triggering condition and the control performance lost into consideration while dealing with the DoS attacks. For the proposed resilient triggering strategy, we must guarantee the successful transmission of the control signal which reach to the up bound of the uncertain of the triggering condition. Or the NCSs may be crashed by DoS
